Although the objective of provider performance measurement is to improve quality of care, little evidence exists on whether it has this effect. This study examines the implementation of mandatory quality reporting for Medicare managed care (MMC) plans. We compare utilization rates of performance-measured services for Medicare beneficiaries who were and were not enrolled in these plans before and after the program's introduction. We find that the use of measured services increased among both MMC and fee-for-service beneficiaries after the adoption of performance measurement. Our results provide no evidence that performance measurement increased quality of care among MMC enrollees.
Although the objective of provider performance measurement is to improve quality of care, little evidence exists on whether it has this effect. This study examines the implementation of mandatory quality reporting for Medicare managed care (MMC) plans. We compare utilization rates of performance-measured services for Medicare beneficiaries who were and were not enrolled in these plans before and after the program's introduction. We find that the use of measured services increased among both MMC and fee-for-service beneficiaries after the adoption of performance measurement. Our results provide no evidence that performance measurement increased quality of care among MMC enrollees.
Many efforts to improve health care quality rely on developing measures of comparative provider performance and publicly disseminating this information. The Medicare program, which provides health insurance coverage for elderly and disabled Americans, has been a key driver of these types of initiatives. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS, formerly known as the Health Care Financing Administration) publicly released the first hospital mortality rankings in 1986 (Mennemeyer et al. 1997) , and CMS currently provides beneficiaries with comparative quality information for hospitals, nursing homes, and health plans.
Health plans have been at the center of initiatives to improve health care quality through standardized performance measurement, not only in the Medicare program, but also for the under-65 commercial population. The National Committee for Quality Assur-ance (NCQA), a private, not-for-profit organization, has developed and disseminated measures of health plan quality since the early 1990s. In 1996, CMS made participation in health plan performance measurement mandatory for managed care plans serving the Medicare population.
Although the primary objective of health plan ''report cards'' is to improve health care quality, surprisingly little evidence exists on whether they have had this effect. Research on their effects, in both the Medicare and commercial populations, has focused primarily on whether they have influenced health plan enrollment. Early studies generally found that health plan report cards were not widely used by consumers, generating skepticism over their potential to improve quality of care (Gabel, Hunt, and Hurst 1998; Schauffler and Mordavsky 2001) . More recent work has demonstrated that they have had at least a small effect on health plan enrollment choices (Beaulieu 2002; Scanlon et al. 2002; Wedig and Tai-Seale 2002; Dafny and Dranove 2005; Jin and Sorensen 2005; Chernew et al. 2001) . While these studies are useful for identifying potential mechanisms for quality improvement, they do not provide information about whether report cards ultimately have affected quality of care. This project, in contrast, directly examines the effects of health plans' mandatory participation in performance measurement on the quality of care received by Medicare beneficiaries. Our analysis focuses on the supplyside, rather than the demand-side, effects of health plan performance measurement.
Background
Historically, NCQA has offered health plans two mechanisms for reporting quality. Plans could apply for NCQA accreditation, which is based on a detailed review of a health plan's clinical and administrative systems, and they also could report their performance on indicators in the Health Plans Employer Data and Information Set (HEDIS), a set of performance measures developed and maintained by NCQA. From 1993 to 1995, health plans participating in HEDIS used an early version of the indicators developed for the commercial market, and the results were largely used internally by health maintenance organizations (HMOs). In 1996, NCQA introduced a significantly revised and expanded set of HEDIS indicators (HEDIS 3.0). These revisions included modifications of some measures developed for the commercial market, as well as new measures developed specifically for the Medicare population (NCQA 1996) .
In 1997, all health plans participating in the Medicare program were required to submit data on HEDIS measures relevant to Medicare (NCQA 1996) , and a significant number of health plans began participating in the program a year earlier (Lied and Sheingold 2001) . Plan compliance with this requirement was strong; nearly 98% of plans contracting with Medicare reported at least some of the HEDIS measures in 1997. In 1998, CMS also launched the www.Medicare.gov Web site to disseminate quality information to beneficiaries, and HEDIS measures became available through the site in 1999.
Participation by health plans in performance measurement can improve quality of care through a number of mechanisms. First, if consumers use this information to choose among health plans, a resulting shift by enrollees from low-quality to high-quality providers can lead to an increase in the average level of quality of care through the reallocation of consumers to higher quality plans. The availability of standardized measures, however, also may increase both the incentives and the ability of health plans to improve their performance. If consumers seek high-quality providers in response to quality information, plans have an incentive to improve their performance either to increase their market share or to be able to charge higher premiums. This type of response would increase the quality of care provided by at least some plans. Finally, the availability of standardized performance indicators may facilitate quality improvement among health plans by providing validated metrics to identify areas in which their performance is low relative to competitors and to evaluate the effectiveness of efforts to improve performance.
Whether performance measurement affects quality of care in practice, however, depends on the extent to which consumers and providers use the information. The introduction of health plan report cards in the Medicare program had a significant influence on enrollment in managed care plans, primarily by shifting beneficiaries from lower to higher average quality plans, rather than by increasing overall enrollment in Medicare managed care (MMC) (Dafny and Dranove 2005) . This effect, however, was driven primarily by consumer satisfaction scores rather than by measures of the process of care. These findings indicate that while the consumer response to quality information might have created incentives for plans to improve their performance, plans had stronger incentives to improve on measures of beneficiary satisfaction than measures of clinical quality of care.
Health plan performance measurement may affect quality of care even in the absence of evidence that consumers use the information when making enrollment decisions. In case studies and qualitative research, representatives from managed care organizations note that HEDIS performance indicators are widely used to implement and monitor plans' quality improvement activities (Perry 2000; Scanlon et al. 2001) . And in the case of mandatory hospital report cards, the information appears to have influenced provider practice patterns even without evidence that patients were aware of the information (Dranove et al. 2003) . Taken together, these findings leave open the possibility that health plans may have responded to the requirement that they report their performance, even in the absence of evidence that consumers would use the information in making enrollment decisions. 1 Participation by MMC plans in HEDIS performance measurement also may affect the quality of care for Medicare beneficiaries with traditional coverage. Market-level managed care activity has affected both expenditures and treatment patterns for the Medicare fee-for-service (FFS) population (Baker 1997; Bundorf et al. 2004 ). Due to the existence of these types of spillovers between sectors, efforts by MMC plans to improve quality of care for their enrollees also may improve quality of care for Medicare FFS beneficiaries. While this type of spillover effect would not directly benefit beneficiaries enrolled in MMC plans, it is important from a policy perspective because it suggests that efforts by the Medicare program to improve quality in the MMC sector could benefit Medicare beneficiaries more broadly.
Relatively few studies have examined the effects of health plan quality reporting on treatment patterns or patient outcomes. NCQA has documented a dramatic improvement over time in the average scores of participating plans on performance indicators (NCQA 2003) . Similarly, Lied and Sheingold (2001) found that the scores of MMC plans on four HEDIS performance indicators (access to preventive/ambulatory health services, beta blocker treatment after heart attack, breast cancer screening, and eye exams for diabetics) improved between 1996 and 1998, after the implementation of man-datory quality reporting. Other research has documented improvements in average performance on nine HEDIS measures for Medicare managed care enrollees during the period 1997-2003 (Trivedi et al. 2005) .
While these findings are suggestive, they do not provide strong evidence that health plans' mandatory participation in HEDIS drove these changes in treatment patterns. First, the studies lack a control group. The increase in utilization among beneficiaries enrolled in MMC may reflect broader trends in the use of services, independent of performance measurement, which affected all types of beneficiaries. In addition, for studies based on the scores reported by health plans to either NCQA or CMS, improvements in performance may have been driven by improvements in measurement as well as changes in service utilization. In particular, if an enrollee is sampled for a performance measure and the health plan is unable to verify whether the individual received the service, the individual is treated as not receiving it. While this creates strong incentives for health plans to improve their documentation, it also makes it difficult to disentangle improvements in performance from improvements in measurement when analyzing the scores reported by plans (Scanlon et al. 2006) . Finally, because the population of beneficiaries enrolled in MMC is not fixed, changes on performance indicators may be driven by changes in enrollment in MMC plans.
Taken together, these limitations in existing studies may be important. While trends in HEDIS scores for commercial plans also indicate widespread improvements in the reported measures (NCQA 2003), a study that looked at the impact of health plan participation in reporting on quality of care for the commercial population addressed these issues and found evidence of improved performance on only one (eye exams for diabetics) of four indicators studied (Bundorf and Baker 2006) .
Analytical Approach
We examine whether the implementation of mandatory performance measurement for MMC plans differentially affected the use of measured services for MMC enrollees and beneficiaries not enrolled in these plans. Our approach addresses the limitations of existing evidence in a number of ways. First, participation in performance measurement was mandatory for plans serving the Medicare market, as opposed to the commercial market where plans' participation was voluntary; this eliminates potential concerns over the effects of voluntary participation on the set of plans participating. Second, by comparing the utilization of measured services among MMC enrollees in the periods before and after introduction of mandatory quality reporting, we can identify the effect of the program based on longitudinal changes in service use, rather than on cross-sectional comparisons. In addition, we use Medicare beneficiaries with traditional FFS coverage as a control group for trends in utilization that may have occurred independent of performance measurement. To establish the validity of using this population as a control group, we examine the potential effects of selection between the MMC and FFS populations and spillovers in practice patterns from MMC to the FFS population. Finally, our analyses are conducted using a data set for which reports of utilization are unaffected by the incentives facing health plans to improve their measurement of service use. In allowing us to address these issues, this individual-level analysis has significant advantages over a plan-level analysis.
We study the period from 1993 to 1999. Although managed care plans were required to begin reporting their performance to Medicare in 1997, some plans began in 1996. Due to this ambiguity in the timing of the implementation, we have dropped 1996 from our analyses and define 1993 to 1995 as the ''pre-reporting period'' and 1997 to 1999, the period following implementation of mandatory reporting, as the ''reporting period.'' During the reporting period, plans were required to report their scores to NCQA and the Medicare program, and they knew that this information ultimately would be made publicly available. The scores, however, were not released publicly to beneficiaries until 1999. While our study examines the period prior to release of the information, MMC plans were aware that the information eventually would be released to the public and this knowledge may have created incentives for them to improve their performance.
Data
The primary data source is the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS), a survey of a nationally representative sample of approximately 12,000 Medicare beneficiaries conducted annually by CMS. We use the 1993 to 1999 years of the MCBS (excluding 1996). The survey includes comprehensive information on health status, health care use and expenditures, health insurance coverage, and socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of respondents. We use the MCBS Cost and Use files, as opposed to the Access to Care files, because they include information on drug utilization among Medicare beneficiaries. We restrict our study sample to noninstitutionalized Medicare beneficiaries age 65 and older residing in a metropolitan area during the survey year.
An additional source of data is the Medicare Managed Care Market Penetration files for the period 1993-1999 from CMS. This report provides annual (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) or quarterly (1997) (1998) (1999) information on the number of Medicare beneficiaries and managed care enrollment by county and plan. We use these data to calculate the share of Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in managed care plans in each county in the United States for each year. When quarterly data were available, we estimated the annual rate by averaging the enrollment and eligibility data across quarters.
Dependent Variables
We examine the utilization of four services that were among the set of HEDIS performance indicators. To be included in our analyses, the service had to be a HEDIS performance measure in 1997-the year of the initiation of mandatory participation by MMC plans-and also a variable in the MCBS both in the pre-reporting and reporting periods. We identified three measures that met these criteria: mammogram rates for women 65 to 69, rates of utilization of beta blockers for heart attack patients, and rates of flu shots.
We also examine the rates of eye exams for diabetics. Using the MCBS, we identified diabetics and used the self-report of having had an eye exam in the past year as the measure of utilization. The eye exam question, however, was not added to the MCBS questionnaire until 1996, so we are not able to examine rates of utilization prior to the implementation of mandatory performance measurement. Despite this important limitation, we include results for this measure because a study of the impact of health plans' participation in HEDIS on quality of care in the commercial population found evidence that participation resulted in improvements for this indicator, but not for others (Bundorf and Baker 2006) . In addition, the diabetes indicator is one of the oldest and most widely used HEDIS indicators.
For beta blocker use, an important difference exists between the HEDIS measure and the utilization we are able to measure with the MCBS. The HEDIS performance indicator is the percentage of plan members age 35 and older who were discharged from the hospital after surviving a heart attack and who received a prescription for a beta blocker. Employing the MCBS, we define the eligible sample as Medicare beneficiaries who indicated they ever had a heart attack. We base our analysis on this broader population because we are unable to identify recent heart attacks for all Medicare beneficiaries for the entire period of the study. 2 In addition, while the HEDIS indicator is based on whether a beta blocker was prescribed upon discharge, the MCBS measure is based on use of a beta blocker at any point during the year. We expect these differences in the samples, as well as the discrepancy between prescribing and utilization patterns due to patient noncompliance, to generate a much lower rate of utilization in our sample relative to that reported by plans.
Because the variable we employ does not precisely capture the measured behavior, we cannot rule out the possibility that we may miss changes in practice patterns that were caused by performance measurement but not captured by our measure. This measure, however, does capture an important aspect of performance measurement-whether the measured activities (in this case, providing patients with a prescription) ultimately leads the patients to use the recommended therapies. If we find evidence that the intervention improved performance on this measure, it will provide strong evidence of its effectiveness in improving quality of care. In contrast, if we find no evidence that utilization increased in response to performance measurement, it will not be possible to determine whether the intervention led to higher rates of beta blocker prescribing that failed to translate to higher utilization rates or whether it had no effect on prescribing patterns.
The MCBS Prescribed Medicine Events file lists the names of the prescription drugs used by survey participants in each year. To determine which survey participants used beta blockers, we first identified all the potential beta blockers on the market employing the 1993 and 2000 Physicians' Desk Reference (PDR). The beta blockers (listed as cardiovascular agents in the PDR) that we included are beta adrenergic blocking agents and beta adrenergic blocking agents with diuretics. We then matched the text from the MCBS variable with the list of potential drugs. To capture all relevant drugs coded in the MCBS data set, we searched for both the proprietary name and the generic name. If we found any record of utilization of a beta blocker, we coded an individual as using beta blockers. 3 As a sensitivity test for our results, we examine two similar services that were not included as HEDIS performance indicators during the study period and potentially provide a falsification test for any positive effects of the intervention on measured services that we observe. Evidence of increases in use of unmeasured services in response to performance measurement would suggest that improvements in measured performance might be driven by factors other than the intervention. One control indicator is rates of Pap smears among women ages 65 to 69, the eligible sample for the mammogram performance indicator. This indicator may capture trends in the utilization of preventive services among this group. Pap smear rates were a performance indicator for the commercial population beginning in 1998, but not for the Medicare population. We also examine rates of pneumonia vaccine among all older adults. This was introduced as a performance indicator for this population in 2001, subsequent to the period of our study.
All utilization in our study is self-reported by survey respondents. The comparison between the utilization rate in our data and the HEDIS reported rates varies. For flu shots, the rate reported by NCQA for MMC plans in 2003 was 74.5% (NCQA 2004 ), compared to 74.0% in 1999 for the self-reported rates in the MCBS. For the beta blocker measure, as expected, the rate was much lower for the selfreported use in the MCBS than for the HEDIS measure-29% compared to 78.5% in 1997 (Lied and Sheingold 2001) . For rates of eye exams for diabetics, the Medicare HEDIS rate was 62.8% in 2000 (NCQA 2004 ), compared to 67% in our study in 1999. The biggest difference was for rates of mammogram. The self-reported rate was 65% in the MCBS, compared to the HEDIS-reported rate of 74.5% in 1998 (Lied and Sheingold 2001) . While this suggests that survey respondents may be under-reporting mammogram utilization, this would be problematic for our study design only if beneficiaries differentially make errors in self-reports by insurance type and if observable characteristics of beneficiaries, such as education and age, do not adequately control for these differences. Insurance status is likely to be coded relatively accurately due to the ability to link the survey respondents to enrollment information from Medicare in the MCBS.
Independent Variables
The MCBS provides information on a variety of demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of survey respondents that we use as control variables. These include: age (five-year groups), sex (female indicator), education (categorical indicator of 0 to eight years, nine to 11 years, at least high school graduate, and college graduate or more), marital status (indicator of currently married), race (indicators of black, white, and other), and ethnicity (indicator of Hispanic). The independent variables also have controls for health status, We measure insurance status based on an indicator of whether the beneficiary had a particular type of coverage at any point in the year. We classify individuals into a single source of coverage (many beneficiaries report multiple sources) based on the following hierarchy: Medicare HMO, employer-sponsored supplemental, individual Medigap, Medicaid, other coverage, and Medicare only (no supplemental coverage). Because mandatory quality reporting applies only to Medicare managed care plans, we ultimately compare individuals classified as having Medicare HMO coverage to those with any other source. 4 In Table 1 , we present descriptive statistics for control variables in our models for the study sample eligible for each performance indicator.
Data Analysis
We first examine trends in utilization for each of the performance indicators among the eligible population in the pre-reporting (1993) (1994) (1995) and reporting (1997) (1998) (1999) periods. We then formally develop a ''differencein-differences'' estimate of the effect of performance measurement on the utilization of measured services based on the following initial model:
where i indexes individuals, m indexes markets, and t indexes years. y i,m,t is a binary indicator of whether the individual received a particular service, H i is an indicator of whether the individual is enrolled in an HMO, I t is an indicator of whether mandatory performance reporting had been implemented during the time period, and Z t includes indicator variables for the relevant year.
In this model, b 2 measures whether the difference in utilization between MMC enrollees and other beneficiaries changed after the implementation of performance measurement. Estimates of b 2 .0 would be consistent with the implementation of mandatory performance measurement improving quality of care for MMC enrollees. Interpreting b 2 as an unbiased estimate of this effect, however, depends on two important assumptions: 1) that the implementation of mandatory performance measurement was not associated with selection of beneficiaries across sectors that was correlated with preferences for the types of services measured, and 2) that mandatory performance reporting had no effect on beneficiaries enrolled in FFS Medicare. Violations of either assumption would bias our results. For example, if implementation of performance measurement in the MMC market induced individuals with strong preferences for the types of services measured to switch from traditional Medicare to a MMC plan, our estimate of the effect of performance measurement on quality of care would be biased upward. Because managed care penetration was growing relatively rapidly during the period, increasing from 11% in 1993 to 22% in 1999, this is potentially an important issue. This growth in enrollment could introduce bias even if it were unrelated to the implementation of performance measurement if preferences for measured services were correlated with preferences for managed care more generally, 5 and research has shown that MMC enrollees differ from FFS beneficiaries in many ways (Schneider et al. 2001) . We address this concern, in part, by adding to the model in equation 1 controls for a variety of individual characteristics as well as a set of dummy variables indicating the county in which the beneficiary resided. Table 1 lists the individual characteristics included in these models.
While adding these variables allows us to control for selection across the sectors based on observable characteristics of individuals, the possibility of selection based on unobservable characteristics remains. In addition, the model supplemented by individual characteristics and market fixed effects does not address potential spillover effects of performance measurement for MMC plans onto other beneficiaries. The Medicare FFS population serves as a control group in our analysis. Thus, if utilization among FFS beneficiaries is affected positively by the performance reporting intervention, the difference in the effects between the control and intervention groups will be an underestimate of the true effect on the intervention group.
We formally test these assumptions and control for their potential effects on our estimates of b 2 using a more complex version of the model presented in equation 1:
In this equation, X i represents the observable individual characteristics described previously and A m represents the market fixed effects. To these variables, we add S m,t , the proportion of Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in MMC plans in market m in year t, as well as the interaction of this share with the indicator of individual enrollment in an HMO (H i,m,t ), and the interaction of these two share variables (S m,t and S m,t *H i,m,t ) with the indicator of the intervention period (I t ). Spillover and selection effects have different implications for the relationship between area-level managed care penetration and utilization of performance indicators for MMC and FFS beneficiaries. b 3 , the coefficient on the share variable, which measures the effect of the share of enrollees in the market's MMC plans on the use of performance indicators by FFS enrollees, could be driven by both selection of beneficiaries into managed care plans and spillovers in treatment patterns from managed care to fee-forservice. b 4 , in contrast, tests whether the effect of MMC penetration differs between MMC and non-MMC enrollees. If selection exists between sectors, the managed care penetration variable will be correlated with utilization rates in each sector. Spillover effects, in contrast, will generate an association between managed care penetration and use of performance indicators only for FFS beneficiaries. b 5 and b 6 measure the difference in these effects between the pre-reporting and reporting periods.
The intuition underlying the model presented in equation 2 is that we can use market-level MMC penetration to control for selection between the two sectors and spillover effects from MMC to FFS. For FFS beneficiaries, this share will capture both market-level selection and spillover effects. For MMC enrollees, the share will capture only selection effects. While the primary objective of including these variables is to obtain unbiased estimates of the effect of performance measurement on the utilization of measured services for MMC enrollees (b 2 ), these effects may be of some independent interest because they provide some insights into the extent of selection and spillover effects. It is important to note, though, that our ability to identify the spillover effect is limited. Because the effect of managed care penetration on managed care enrollees is affected only by selection, a finding that b 3 is not equal to zero is consistent with selection between the sectors. Correspondingly, evidence that b 5 is not equal to zero is consistent with a change in the effects of selection between sectors on utilization of MMC enrollees between the pre-reporting and reporting periods. However, because the effect of managed care penetration on utilization for FFS enrollees is influenced by both selection between sectors and spillover effects, we can identify the existence of spillover effects only in the absence of selection between sectors.
Results
Service use for each of the performance indicators we studied increased among MMC enrollees in the period following implementation of mandatory performance measurement, although the change between 1995 and 1999 was statistically significant only for beta blockers and flu shots ( Table 2) . Among MMC enrollees, the mammogram rate increased three percentage points, utilization of beta blockers increased 14 percentage points, and the flu shot rate increased nine percentage points between 1995 (the year prior to the implementation of mandatory performance measurement) and 1999. Rates of eye exams for diabetics rose five percentage points from 1997 to 1999. During the same time period, however, utilization of these measured indicators also increased among Medicare beneficiaries not enrolled in these plans (Table 2) . Between 1995 and 1999, use of mammograms, beta blockers, and flu shots increased 12, 15, and eight percentage points, respectively, for beneficiaries not enrolled in MMC plans. Between 1997 and 1999, the proportion of diabetics receiving eye exams increased eight percentage points among FFS beneficiaries. For most of the indicators, the percentagepoint increase was similar between MMC enrollees and FFS beneficiaries. In the case of mammograms, however, the increase was larger among Medicare FFS beneficiaries than MMC enrollees. The similarity in the two groups' changes in utilization suggests that the increase among MMC enrollees may be attributable to factors that affected all Medicare beneficiaries, not only those enrolled in MMC plans.
Trends in utilization were generally less dramatic in the period prior to the implementation of performance measurement, but differed across the studied indicators (Table 2). The mammogram rate was stable in the MMC group and growing in the FFS population. Beta blocker use, in contrast, was increasing in the MMC population and relatively stable in the FFS population. Finally, rates of flu shots were increasing rapidly among both MMC enrollees and FFS beneficiaries prior to the implementation of performance measurement.
Trends in utilization of the control indicators in the reporting period were also similar between the two groups of beneficiaries ( Table 2) . Rates of vaccination for pneumonia increased dramatically and significantly for both MMC enrollees and FFS beneficiaries, but both groups experienced relatively small increases in Pap smear rates that were not statistically significant.
We formalize the comparisons presented in Table 2 by estimating equation 1. These results are in column 1 of Table 3 for each performance indicator. In these models, the coefficient on the indicator of MMC enroll-ment measures the difference in utilization between MMC and FFS beneficiaries. The interaction between the indicator of MMC enrollment and the indicator of the reporting period tests whether that relationship changed subsequent to the implementation of performance measurement. Using this model, which includes controls for only the independent variables identified in Table 3 and year fixed effects, we find that for mammogram rates, a positive effect of MMC enrollment prior to the implementation of performance measurement (coefficient 5 .122) largely disappears in the reporting period (coefficient 5 2.114). Although this would be consistent with mandatory performance measurement reducing use of the performance indicator among MMC enrollees, it seems unlikely to be a causal effect since the trends in Table 2 suggest that this negative effect is driven primarily by the rapid increase in mammogram rates among FFS beneficiaries in the reporting period.
The estimates for beta blockers and flu shots from the unadjusted model (equation 1) are essentially zero-the magnitude of the coefficient on the interaction between the indicators of MMC enrollee and the reporting period is small and not statistically significant (see Table 3 , column 1 for each indicator). In other words, the difference between MMC enrollees and FFS beneficiaries in rates of utilization for these indicators did not change between the pre-reporting and reporting periods.
The estimates from the unadjusted models presented in column 1 provide little evidence that the implementation of performance measurement was associated with an increase in use of measured services among MMC enrollees. These estimates do not appear to be biased to a large degree by the omission of controls for observable characteristics of beneficiaries (see Table 3 , column 2 for each indicator). In the case of mammograms, when we include the individual characteristics and market fixed effects, we find that the negative effect we observed in the unadjusted model (column 1) is due in part to selection of enrollees into managed care plans based on observable characteristics. The estimate of the effect of performance measurement on MMC enrollees (the coefficient on the interaction term between MMC enrollment and the postreporting period) is smaller in magnitude and no longer statistically significant when we add these controls; this suggests that the reporting period was characterized by selection of beneficiaries into MMC who were less likely to receive mammograms based on observable characteristics. For the models of beta blocker and flu shot rates, adding these controls for individual characteristics has little effect on our results, and we continue to find no evidence that the implementation of performance measurement improved quality of care for MMC enrollees. We examine the effects of both selection across sectors based on unobservable characteristics and spillovers from MMC to the FFS population by including the market-level MMC penetration and the interactions of this variable with the indicators of MMC enrollee and the reporting period as described by equation 2 (Table 3, column 3) . In the case of mammograms, controlling for these effects further reduces the magnitude of the estimate of the negative effect of performance measurement on quality of care for MMC enrollees. The coefficient on the interaction between the MMC enrollment and reporting period indicators is small and not statistically significant. Examining the interaction terms, we find that the negative effect of performance measurement we observed in columns 1 and 2 appears to have been driven primarily by selection of Medicare beneficiaries into managed care plans in the pre-reporting period. The coefficient on the interaction between MMC penetration and managed care enrollment is large and statistically significant, indicating that as the proportion of the population enrolled in MMC in a market increased, managed care enrollees were more likely to receive mammograms, based on unobservable characteristics. This type of selection appears to have dissipated in the reporting period, although the coefficient on the interaction of MMC share*MMC enrollee*Reporting period is not statistically significant.
In the cases of beta blockers and flu shots, we find that including MMC market penetration and its interactions with individual plan type of reporting period has little impact on the estimate of the effect of performance measurement on use of measured services for MMC enrollees. We continue to find no evidence that this program was associated with higher rates of utilization of measured services for these beneficiaries. For the model of flu shot utilization, the coefficients of these additional controls are generally small and the effects are not statistically significant.
The additional controls provide information about selection, particularly in the case of beta blockers. Here, we find that the interaction between MMC penetration and the reporting period indicator has a positive and statistically significant effect. This shows that the likelihood that a Medicare FFS beneficiary with a history of AMI received a beta blocker increased with the level of MMC penetration in the beneficiary's market in the reporting period relative to the pre-reporting period. Although the coefficient on this variable represents a combination of selection across sectors and spillover effects, the estimate of the selection effect (the coefficient on the three-way interaction among MMC penetration, MMC enrollee, and reporting period) is relatively small and not statistically significant, suggesting that the spillover effect may be important.
In Table 4 , we present the results of a similar analysis of eye exam rates for diabetics, with the caveat that we are unable to control for the trends in utilization prior to the implementation of performance measurement. In this case, we again find no evidence that diabetics in MMC plans were more likely than those in Medicare FFS to receive eye exams when performance measurement was in place (column 1). The estimate of the effect is not sensitive to controls for observable characteristics of individuals (column 2). Finally, we find little evidence of either selection across sectors based on unobservable characteristics or the existence of spillovers from performance measurement in the managed care population on quality of care for FFS beneficiaries (column 3). Including the additional MMC market share controls has little impact on the estimate of the effect of performance measurement.
In Table 5 , we present results of the models examining rates of utilization of the control indicators-that is, services not included in the set of HEDIS performance measures. Comparing Medicare MMC and FFS beneficiaries, we find no evidence that during the reporting period differences increased in the utilization rates of either Pap smears among women 65 to 69 or pneumonia vaccination among all aged Medicare beneficiaries. We do find evidence that rates of pneumonia vaccination were higher among MMC enrollees throughout the study period.
Discussion
We find no evidence that use of measured services increased more quickly among MMC enrollees than Medicare FFS beneficiaries in the period following introduction of mandatory participation by MMC plans in performance measurement. By controlling for MMC market share and its interaction with type of insurance coverage and differences in these variables in the pre-reporting and reporting periods, we also demonstrate that the lack of a difference between the two groups was driven neither by selection of beneficiaries between the two sectors nor the possibility of spillovers from performance measurement activities in the MMC population to FFS beneficiaries. This finding is notable given earlier research documenting an increase in rates of utilization of measured services among MMC enrollees subsequent to the adoption of mandatory performance measurement (Lied and Sheingold 2001; Trivedi et al. 2005) . Our results demonstrate that these improvements in quality experienced by MMC enrollees were not restricted to the MMC sector.
One possible interpretation of our findings is that MMC plans' mandatory participation in performance measurement did not improve quality of care for plan enrollees. Quality improvements in the MMC sector may have been attributable to factors other than MMC performance measurement that affected all Medicare beneficiaries. A number of possible explanations exist for why the implementation of this program may not have increased MMC enrollees' use of the services measured for performance. One is that the anticipated future release of this information did not create strong enough incentives for plans to implement quality improvement initiatives. This explanation is supported by research demonstrating that the ultimate public release of information on plan performance on these indicators had relatively little impact on beneficiary enrollment decisions (Dafny and Dranove 2005) . Most of the effect on enrollment was driven by consumer satisfaction scores. Perhaps plans anticipated this reaction on the part of beneficiaries and correctly focused on consumer satisfaction measures that ultimately were more influential in enrollment decisions. Another potential explanation is that because some of the indicators we studied were part of the reporting requirements for the commercial population prior to the implementation of quality reporting in the Medicare market (beta blockers and mammogram), plans participating in MMC already may have had initiatives to improve performance in these areas. In other words, Medicare beneficiaries may have benefited from the collection and reporting of this type of information for the under-65 population prior to the implementation of mandatory reporting for Medicare plans. While this is supported somewhat by the rapid increase in use of beta blockers among MMC enrollees with a history of AMI prior to mandatory quality reporting, other research finds little evidence that health plans' voluntary participation in HEDIS for the commercial population improved quality of care (Bundorf and Baker 2006) . Similarly, it is possible that some of the effects of the intervention occurred subsequent to the time period we studied. For MMC plans that had not participated in HEDIS prior to the Medicare requirement or those that had recently entered the Medicare market, the effects of performance measurement may have occurred with a lag.
Finally, we examine only a small subset of HEDIS performance indicators, and it is possible that the findings are unique to the indicators we studied. In particular, perhaps mammogram and flu shot use are determined less by health plans than by individual physicians, patient preferences, or other types of public health awareness programs. We find that rates of both flu shot (a performance indicator) and pneumonia vaccine (not a performance indicator during the period of our study) grew dramatically over the entire study period for beneficiaries in both MMC plans and traditional Medicare, suggesting that other types of influences were driving these increases.
An alternative interpretation of our findings is that mandatory performance measurement did indeed improve quality among MMC enrollees, but the control group in our analysis-FFS enrollees-experienced similar improvements due to factors unrelated to performance measurement for MMC plans. Beginning in 1996, CMS began a program to track the quality of care provided to Medicare FFS beneficiaries and committed its peer review organizations to systematically promote improvements on these quality measures using a ''voluntary, collaborative, and nonpunitive educational strategy'' (Jencks et al. 2000) . It is possible that performance measurement among MMC plans and this quality initiative targeted to the FFS population simultaneously improved quality among the two groups, particularly because many of the same measures were tracked in the two initiatives. While this is possible, the results from one of our control indicators cast some doubt on this explanation. In particular, rates of pneumonia vaccination were not performance indicators for either MMC or FFS enrollees prior to the start of mandatory reporting for MMC plans. While pneumonia vaccination ultimately was measured in the FFS initiative, it was not for MMC enrollees. Yet, rates of pneumonia vaccination rose for the two groups, both before and after implementation of this program. These trends suggest that the improvement in performance, at least on this particular measure, was not driven by the quality initiatives put in place for either group.
Finally, it is possible that changes in the composition of plans serving the market during this time period obscured a positive effect of quality reporting. The number of plans participating in the program increased dramatically during the study period-from approximately 100 in 1993 to 300 in 1999 (Cawley et al. 2005) . The initiative may have had positive effects on performance for some plans, but not for others. For example, perhaps existing plans responded by improving their performance, but new entrants were characterized by relatively low quality. A plan-level analysis potentially could elucidate whether these types of mechanisms explain our findings.
From the perspective of policy development, the findings provide no evidence that making MMC plans' participation in performance measurement mandatory improved quality of care for plan enrollees. Our study, however, does not provide evidence on why this is the case. While we have offered a number of potential explanations for our findings, they have very different implications for policy. Thus, these explanations should be considered in future research demonstrating the effects of more mature versions of these programs.
Notes
Findings from this study were presented at the 2006 Bay Area Healthcare Quality and Outcomes Meeting, the 2006 AcademyHealth Annual Research Meeting, and the 2006 meeting of the American Society of Health Economists.
1 Plan investments in quality in the absence of a response on the part of consumers, however, may not represent a long-run equilibrium. 2 While we could use claims data to identify recent heart attacks among FFS beneficiaries, this information is not available for managed care enrollees. In addition, while the selfreport question was changed in the later years of the survey to allow the identification of new conditions, the change was made subsequent to the years of our study. 3 The Prescribed Medicines File includes a textbased listing of the drugs used by beneficiaries. Many of the recorded drugs were ultimately untranslatable as determined by the contractor creating the file. However, this proportion was similar by beneficiary insurance status. For example, 26.95% of drug events were untranslatable for Medicare managed care enrollees, compared to 26.72% for beneficiaries with employer-sponsored supplemental coverage and 27.21% for those with Medigap. Thus, while the level of prescription drug utilization may be biased downward, it is unlikely that the bias differs between the different groups of beneficiaries. 4 We have tested an alternative approach that uses a similar hierarchy but includes only individuals who were covered for the entire year in a particular type of coverage. The results are substantively the same, although the sample size is smaller. We also have tested for differences in the comparison by supplemental insurance subgroup and found this had no substantive effect on our overall findings for MMC enrollees. This latter test provides support that our findings are not driven by the inclusion of dual-eligibles, who could have been enrolled in a managed care plan, in the control group. 5 It is unlikely that enrollment growth during this period was related to the dissemination of information about quality measures primarily because the information was not publicly released to Medicare beneficiaries until 1999. In addition, Dafny and Dranove (2005) find that quality reporting had little effect on the overall level of enrollment in Medicare managed care plans. Most of the effect of the information was on switching among plans.
